Hurricane Irma impacted Florida on September 10, 2017. The
last of our debris/mulch removal from the staging areas on 114 St. was hauled
off on December 13th, just over three months later. This report is
intended to inform residents of the myriad of mistakes, poor judgement, and
basic ignorance of FEMA and other State requirements demonstrated by our
Village personal in dealing with this hurricanes aftermath. It is clear that we
had no viable Emergency Management Plan in place and instead resorted to uneducated
decisions that failed to take into account changes made to the debris
management site (DMS), sound procedural organization, and the health hazards
created by the proximity of toxic mulch piles.
[CORRECTION 12/21/17: - Commissioner Rox Ross was good enough to forward me the Village's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan from 2012. She states that "no official updates have been made to Reso. 2012-43, but from conversations with prior and current Village Managers, I know that emergency plans have been reviewed at minimum at the start of each hurricane season, when all municipalities are required to attend a coordinated briefing at the County." So, we do have an emergency plan after all]
[CORRECTION 12/21/17: - Commissioner Rox Ross was good enough to forward me the Village's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan from 2012. She states that "no official updates have been made to Reso. 2012-43, but from conversations with prior and current Village Managers, I know that emergency plans have been reviewed at minimum at the start of each hurricane season, when all municipalities are required to attend a coordinated briefing at the County." So, we do have an emergency plan after all]
The purpose of this report is to create a record to identify
these errors in hopes that we can learn from our mistakes and follow the required
rules moving forward. It’s not a matter of “if” but “when” we will have another
hurricane affect us, and the time for systematic planning is prior to the storm, not after the fact.
We simply cannot be caught with our pants down again.
Source material from the FEMA website and/or any other
governmental agency will be shown in blue. Red X’s will denote errors.
Most of this report will deal with the post hurricane “cleanup
stage” of the operation, but there were fundamental mistakes made before we
ever started with the cleanup that we need to identify and understand.
Errors
1.
Power Outages. Power on 114 St. went down on
Saturday night (September 9th) and remained out until late Friday
afternoon. Throughout this time our Village Hall and Police Department
(infrastructures) were without power. During the construction of the new administration
building it was determined that it needed a backup generator, but due to the
cost overruns, a generator was never purchased.
In speaking with FPL and the EOC that covers BP, it was not made clear
that they knew of the new location of the building- as it was not treated as a
priority for power restoration. And this was the first time this ever happened
here. Police stations, hospitals and other important infrastructures are to be
listed as a priority and must be noted to the local EOC. The EOC in turn relays
that information to FPL. Again, in
speaking with FPL it was not clear that they were informed.
2.
Communications Breakdown. There were many complaints about
the lack of communication from the Village immediately following the hurricane.
In hindsight, there should have been a method in place to communicate with our residents prior to the
hurricane on where our “command and control centers” would be located,
police and public safety notices, instructions for debris management, and for
basic guidelines on possible contaminated water restrictions, etc. Relaying on
electronic messaging only after a hurricane strikes when power, internet and
cell service is out (or compromised) for days resulted in unsatisfactory results.
3.
Improper Procedures- FEMA Debris Monitoring
Contract. In short,
Tracy Truppman took it upon herself to enter into a contract on September 12th
without consulting the other Commissioners and before the issuance of an
RFP. This appears to be a Charter
violation. Due to the lack of an RFP, we may not be reimbursed the expenses
incurred by the debris monitoring service which now, due to the extended length
of time is approx. $200,000.00. This
panicked action was improper as there was more than sufficient time to arrange
for an emergency meeting of the Commission to vote on this contract and follow
the required RFP procedure. Debris removal didn’t commence until nearly one
week after the hurricane, so her excuse of acting under some alleged “state of
emergency” is dubious. This looks moreover to be yet another example of her
abuse of power and possibly an expensive mistake for our taxpayers.
From FEMA (excerpts): Decisions made in the first few days after a disaster are critical in
determining the success of a debris removal operation. The quality of
management and oversight remains a key element in success or failure of the
program. State and local governments are encouraged to plan for, and are
expected to manage, their own debris removal operations following an
emergency or major disaster, with eligible costs being reimbursable under the
PA program. As part of debris planning, state and local governments are
encouraged to prequalify local or regional debris removal contractors to ensure
the immediate availability of coordinated debris removal. Another important
element of debris planning and preparation is identifying debris disposal
sites in advance.
Perhaps the only FEMA criteria the Village got right was
having a debris removal contractor in place and in the timing of them clearing
our streets. But as we’ll now discover, that was just a small part of their
overall requirements.
FEMA debris
monitoring specialists do not direct field operations on behalf of the
applicant. The applicant has the primary responsibility for implementing and
managing the debris monitoring activities.
“Field operations” and “oversight” were to be managed
by the applicant, BP in this case and Krishan Manners specifically as the
Manager or point person. Yet, in meeting with him twice over the span of
several days to inquire about the delays in power restoration to the Police Station,
he had no answers other than to “be patient and FPL is here working hard.” After hearing this same canned response from
him for a second time days later, I drove the entire Village myself and found
not one FPL truck (or any other power contractor) working in the Village. I
then proceeded back to the Rec. Center to inform him of this and mentioned that
if he’s being told by FPL that “they’re here working hard,” he has been
misinformed. His reaction was to immediately call FPL, (in front of me) only to
get their voice mail… Point being, why was he unaware that we had no one in
the Village working to restore our power? His actions were to “defer to the
professionals” and as such failed to deliver proper oversight and field
management as outlined by FEMA.
As FEMA states above, “Decisions made in the first few days after a disaster are critical in
determining the success of a debris removal operation.” As we’ll
discover in this report, the decisions made over the first few days were faulty,
uneducated and as such resulted in numerous errors that extended the entire
timeline of the cleanup operation thus costing our taxpayers extra money and personal
hardships.
“Identifying debris disposal sites in advance.” According to DERM, the last disposal
site request received from the Village for approval was the year 2012. That’s 5 years ago. This is required annually. So, in essence the
two locations used on 114 St. were considered illegal dump sites from September
through late November due to not having the required preapproval and permit for
use. X
Site
selection should be based on the following criteria:
• Ownership
• Size
• Location
• Environmental and historic concerns
(baseline study findings)
Applicant-owned
sites that will not require extensive repair costs, such as parks, vacant lots,
or sports fields, should be considered as well.
Size and Location: Apparently there was no
consideration to the material changes made to the main dump site due to the new
building, parking lot and drain field which reduced over half of the previous usable
space. Basic common sense should have dictated that due to this space reduction
this site was no longer a viable option. But, rather my belief is that the
prevailing thought was “we’ve used this site before, so we’ll just do it
again.” Grubbs (the debris removal contractor)
commented to me more than once that this site was too small and as such presented
multiple problems for them to properly work within its confines. Which led to another
violation dealing with the lack of controlling the pile itself as it extended
into the private property of the Church and breached standard setback
requirements resulting in property damage. X
Baseline Data Collection: Baseline data collection is essential to documenting the
condition of the land before it is used as a DMS. Private and public land
used as a DMS needs to be returned to its original condition following the end
of all debris operations. As soon as a potential site is selected, the
designated Debris Project Manager and staff should work closely with local,
tribal, and State officials to develop baseline data criteria. The following
actions are suggested to document the baseline data on all sites:
1. Videotape and/or Photograph the Site. Thoroughly videotape and/or photograph (ground or aerial) each site before beginning any
activities. Periodically update video and photographic documentation to track
site evolution.
2. Document Physical Features. Note existing structures, fences, culverts, irrigation
systems, and landscaping that can help evaluate possible damage claims made
later.
3. Investigation
of Historic Significance. Research the past use
and ownership of the property to document any issues regarding the existence of
historic structures or archeological sites.
4. Sample Soil and Water. Soil and groundwater samples should be collected prior
to use of the site. Advance planning with community and State environmental
agencies can establish requirements, chain of custody, acceptable sampling
methods, certified laboratories, and testing parameters.
X. To my knowledge, none of these baseline
data collection guidelines were followed.
Due to the
extended length of time it has taken to remove all of the debris, we have lost some
money from FEMA towards our reimbursement. The first tier deadline of 90% had
passed on December 2nd, the deadline to drop to 75% reimbursement is on Dec
19th, and we are currently at 80%. So,
it looks like the loss is 10% (which we split 50/50 with the State) based on
the cost of what wasn’t completed by December 2nd. As of this
writing, I have no idea as to how much money this actually represents. X
Environmental and
Historic Concerns: Being that BP hadn’t followed the
proper procedure over the past five years of submitting disposal site
location(s) for review and approval,
there was clear ignorance demonstrated over the fact that these sites on 114
St. are listed as a historic district. This, based on the historical
designation of our Log Cabin. In speaking with DERM and the Miami-Dade Historical
Preservation Society, both indicated that after this current cleanup is
completed, they will disallow any future
use of these locations. Compliance with
environmental and historic preservation requirements is required. X
So, Biscayne Park needs to come up with an alternate DMS feasibility
plan and submit it in advance for review
and approval prior to next year’s hurricane season.
Environmental
and Health Hazards: Location- The debris management site (DMS) should be established in
an area that does not impede the flow of traffic along major transportation
corridors, disrupt local business operations, or cause dangerous conditions
in residential neighborhoods or schools. Whenever possible, avoid
locating a DMS near residential areas, schools, churches, hospitals, and
other such sensitive areas.
In the process of using the main DMS, the Village violated
most of the FEMA criteria in creating dangerous conditions to residents and residential
property, and staging areas that were too close to a Church and the School that
operates there. X
Health and
Safety Strategy: Applicants (BP) should include a health and safety
strategy in the overall debris management plan. The health and safety strategy
should establish minimum safety standards for the applicant and contractor
personnel to follow. The health and safety strategy should identify potential
hazards at debris loading areas and DMS. Many of these actions can pose safety
hazards to the public. Mixed debris that contains hazardous materials, can pose
potential health risks.
Equipment and fuel should have a designated storage area
and signs posted appropriately. The fuel storage areas need to be designed to
contain spills. Water should be readily available at all times. Water storage
areas should be strategically positioned throughout the site and identified
appropriately.
We had no health or safety strategy. It seems as if we had no
strategy at all. X
Mulch stored in huge piles, 10 to 20 feet deep, has also been known to
build up enough heat from internal decomposition to start a fire. Mulch can be hot enough to produce steam.
When mulch becomes too dry, the heat can build until a fire begins from
spontaneous combustion. Steam rising off a pile of mulch (producing gray ash)
occurs when the hot air from the decomposing wood mixes with cooler air. Also,
as the mulch heats up, it cannot release the gas, and the mulch piles actually become toxic. When this occurs the mulch
develops an over bearing odor that will take your breath away.
Residents on 114 St. that I have spoken to have all suffered various health issues due to the proximity of the vegetation and mulch piles. Typically, these fell under respiratory related problems, sinus and varying degrees of coughing and sneezing. Also, there were reports of sore throats and burning eyes.
According to
DERM, mulch piles are not to sit for 30 days due to the hazards they present (fire
and health) as listed above. The mulch piles at the main DMS sat for over 30
days. I emailed Krishan Manners on November 20th asking for
answers to 6 questions, one to include the core temperature readings of the
mulch piles as they were producing steam. This being a concern for me specifically
as I had mulch piles in close proximity to both one side and behind my house.
I also
inquired as to what schedule the piles were being safety monitored as the site
was forced to be abandoned for 10 days due to not having a permit for use. That email remains unanswered… which leads me to…
Debris Hauling Delays and the Mysterious RFP.
Krishan first explained in his
weekly report during the week of October 27th that we were having
hauling delays due to fact that “our contract price is considerably less” than
the current market rate. This language is repeated, cut and pasted, up until
the week of November 9th, when he first mentions the “preparation of
an RFP” to bid on other haulers. This resulting from the impasse with Grubbs,
and FEMA stating they would not pay anything over our contracted rate (which
was 4-5X’s too low). This information is now also cut and pasted verbatim in
his reports up until Thanksgiving week when Grubbs finally agreed to haul off
the debris (at a loss) which started on Friday November 25th. To
review, Krishan first disclosed the problem of the hauling rate during the week
of October 27th, yet the process of actually removing the mulch
piles didn’t occur until November 25th. And the RFP mentioned on November 9th never materialized.
That meant that the residents of 114 St. had to continue to suffer the effects
of the mulch and vegetation piles for one extra month due to the underpriced
hauling contract and seemingly the inability of the Village to make a decision in
a timely manner. X
Omissions
Assignment of Tasks
The public information strategy should assign staff the
following tasks:
·
Prepare information to be
distributed.
·
Process to distribute the
information.
·
Process to update,
correct, revise, and redistribute information as operations progress.
·
Establish a debris
information center or a venue to address all concerns, questions, and
complaints.
After a disaster, residents want answers regarding
recovery operations. The goal of the public information strategy is to ensure
that the residents are given accurate and timely information. If information is
not distributed quickly, rumors and misinformation spread and erode confidence
in applicant management of the recovery operations.
Update and Redistribution: Residents hold community leaders responsible for
misinformation and slow progress if information is not routinely updated to
remain current and accurate. The planning staff must consider how the public
information strategy addresses changes and revisions as the debris removal
operations progress. The changes in operations directly affect how often
information to the general public is distributed. During the early stages of
the operations, the applicants may rely on the immediate transmission of the information,
such as through radio and television, to update the general public regarding
the debris removal operations. Once the operations become more routine and
predictable, the information can be distributed through the print media, such
as newspapers, mailings, and flyers.
There was little
to no effort from the Village to update, inform or distribute current information
to the residents of 114 St. as stated in the FEMA guidelines. We had delays, a
work stoppage, broken equipment and various other issues to deal with, yet the
Village remained MIA. Krishan was not
visible on our street and has only responded to residents that sought him out. And as previously mentioned, he
still hasn’t replied to my email from November 20th. X
P.S. Kudos to Jason
Clark from Grubbs (or their contractor) who was the only person who provided
updates and information to the residents of 114 St. This may not have been his
responsibility, but he was understanding enough to do so none the less. Thanks
again Jason. Your efforts were much appreciated. And the silence from our paid
employee has been duly noted.
Conclusion
There is more I could add, but I’m sure some of you are
already grumbling due to the length of this report and I’m also running out of
red ink.
DERM did not mention to me if they plan to fine the Village
for its many violations and errors- though they would be within their rights to
do so. According to the DERM inspector, Biscayne Park was the worst example he had
seen in all of the DMS he'd reviewed in the County. DERM did mention that had they not granted us
the “after the fact permit” for the DMS used, we would not be entitled to ANY
FEMA reimbursement. And this is the point I want each and every one of you reading
this to think about. This uneducated mismanagement of hurricane Irma’s
aftermath could have potentially bankrupted our Village. Are you okay with
this?
Krishan, Tracy and whoever else was involved in this decision
making were clearly in over their heads.
The decision to hire Krishan Manners as a Village Manager
knowing he lacked any meaningful municipal government experience was a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Having no contacts in local government or being
reluctant to reach out for help resulted in harming this community needlessly. Residents
were getting sick all around 114 St. and he was totally unaware. I had been in
touch with a friend trying to get some input on our hauling delay problem and it
was mentioned that she asked Ana Garcia if she’d heard anything from us asking
for help or guidance. And the answer was “no”. For any of you who don’t know
Ana (a former Manager here), one thing l’ll tell you about her is that she’s a
mover and a shaker. She’s now managing a $100M budget in NMB. She has a broad array
of contacts and resources and knows how to get things done! Understand this is
not personal, nor is it about if Krishan is a nice guy or not, or how hard he
tries. I have found him to be a nice guy that tries hard. But, this should only be based on his actual performance.
I do realize that the tone of this report is critical. And
due to the nature of this topic, it was unavoidable. All homeowners here are in
essence, shareholders, and I feel we have a common responsibility to each other.
As such we have a right to this information. Please understand that hard truths
to hear are truths just the same. My hope in producing this report is to
encourage the Commission to schedule a community workshop to discuss, dissect and
discover better solutions so that we don’t find ourselves in this dysfunctional
situation again. We need to completely rethink our hurricane debris and
communications programs from the top down.
And that time is now.
Standing Watch,
Milton Hunter
The Biscayne Parker
